Abstract-Forward-secure signatures are proposed to tackle the key exposure problem, in which the security of all signatures prior to key leakage is still kept even if the secret key leaks. In this paper, we construct two forward-secure multisignature schemes, one forward-secure threshold signature scheme, and one forward-secure blind signature scheme. Our constructions are based on the recently proposed forward-secure signature scheme from bilinear maps in [11]. Our constructions are very efficient and useful thanks to the elegant structure of the base scheme. Such schemes play an important role in many electronic applications such as cryptographic election systems, digital cash schemes, and e-cheques.
INTRODUCTION
Forward security for digital signature is proposed to deal with the key exposure problem. In a forward-secure signature scheme, the whole time is divided into discrete time periods. Different secret keys are used to sign the messages in different time periods, while the public key is unchanged during the whole lifetime. The new secret key for the next time period is computed from the old one by a one-way key update paradigm. Each signature is associated with one time period. When the signature is verified, we also need to verify the consistency of the time period. Exposure of the current secret key does not help the adversary to forge a valid signature of previous time period in this primitive.
Forward-secure signature was firstly proposed by Anderson [1] , and then formalized by Bellare and Miner [2] . Bellare and Miner also gave the definition of forward-secure signature scheme and its security. Subsequently some constructions of forward-secure signature schemes [3~6] were proposed, which had different trade-offs among key size, signing time and update time. The scheme [5] had optimal signing and verifying algorithms at the expense of slower key update. In comparison, the scheme [6] could achieve fast key update but had slower signing and verifying algorithms. Malkin et al. [7] proposed generic forward-secure signatures with an unbounded number of time periods. Hierarchical ID-based cryptography could be used to construct forward-secure signature schemes. Based on the hierarchical ID-based cryptography [8] , some forwardsecure signature scheme using bilinear maps were proposed in [9] [10] [11] . Boyen et al. presented a forwardsecure signature with untrusted update [12] , in which the secret key is additionally protected by an extra secret that is possibly derived from a password and key update procedure can be completed by the encrypted version of signing key. Libert et al. [13] gave generic constructions of forward-secure signatures in untrusted update environments.
Forward-secure symmetric-key encryption was studied in [14] and forward-secure public key encryption was also studied in [15] . Forward-secure threshold signatures were researched in [16] [17] [18] [19] . Key-insulation [20] [21] [22] [23] and intrusion-resilient cryptography [24] [25] [26] [27] can achieve a higher level of security than forward-secure cryptography. However, these methods were not able to apply to many scenarios.
Multisignature was firstly proposed by Itakura and Nakamura [28] . Multisignature allows any subgroup of users to cooperate to sign a message. The verifier can assure that any user participates in signing. The security of multisignature was formalized in [29] . Forward-secure multisignature was studied in [30] .
Threshold signature is one kind of distributive signatures. In a (t+1, n) threshold signature, a secret key is distributed into n users, and each user has one share of the secret key. Only more than t users can jointly generate signatures by a reconstruction procedure. The first forward-secure threshold signature was proposed by Abdalla et al. [16] . However, in their scheme the size of both the public key and the secret key are very large, what's more, the scheme needs a lot of interactions. Following by Abdalla's work, another forward-secure threshold signature with proactive property [17] is proposed, which needs shorter keys. Paper [19] proposed an efficient forward-secure threshold signature scheme from bilinear maps.
Blind signature introduced by David Chaum [31] , is a form of digital signature in which the content of a message is blinded before it is signed. The generating blind signature can be verified against the original, unblinded message in the manner of a standard digital signature. Blind signature plays an important role in cryptographic election systems and digital cash schemes. Recently, some papers about blind signatures were published in [32] [33] [34] . Forward-secure blind signatures were proposed in [30, 35] .
Our contribution. We construct two forward-secure multisignature schemes, one forward-secure threshold signature scheme, and one forward-secure blind signature scheme based on the recently proposed forward-secure signature scheme from bilinear maps in [11] . Our constructions very efficient and useful thanks to the base scheme. Such schemes are very important for many ecommerce applications. Our schemes are forward-secure in random oracle model assume CDH problem is hard.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Cryptographic Assumption
We review some cryptographic preliminaries which have been introduced in many papers. 
D. Forward-Secure Blind Signature Scheme
A forward-secure blind signature scheme consists of a key generation algorithm, a key update algorithm, a signing algorithm and a verifying algorithm. ⒋ FMSIG.verify: the verifying algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input the public key PK , a message M and a candidate signature , i sign < > ， and output 1 when , i sign < > is a valid signature or 0, otherwise.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEMES
A. Notations Our schemes use a binary tree in [11] , which is firstly suggested to form forward-secure signature schemes by Bellare and Miner [2] . The notations description is the same as the description in [11] . We omit the description of the notations here. Please refer to [11] . [11] We review the basis forward-secure signature scheme here. The description of this scheme is taken from [11] directly.
B. Review the Forward-Secure Signature Scheme in
Let IG be a CDH parameter generator, therefore the CDH assumption holds. (1) , and compute 0
Compute 0 
Erase all interim data, and return 0 , PK SK . End. 
, and compute U rP = . 
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If it holds, return "valid", otherwise, return "invalid". End
C. The Proposed Forward-Secure Multisignature Schemes
We give two forward-secure multisignature schemes in this subsection. The first scheme has robust property but needs more computations. The second has not robust property but needs fewer computations than the first scheme.
Scheme 1:
Each signer uses the same key algorithm and update algorithm to generate the public key and the secret key in time i. For convenience, we denote the secret key signer j holds in time period i
We describe the signing algorithm and the verifying algorithm as follows.
, and compute
The partial signature is
We can use the following equation to verify whether the partial signature is valid or not: 
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In order to make the verifying algorithm simpler, we construct another forward-secure multisignature scheme by modifying the key algorithm and update algorithm as follows: (1 We modify the procedure as follows:
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, and then compute
The signing algorithm and the verifying algorithm are as follows:
, compute and broadcast
And then compute 
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The proposed forward-secure threshold signature scheme In order to construct the forward-secure threshold scheme, we modify the key algorithm and update algorithm as follows: (1)The first modification is in key algorithm. All signer
, and Q is included into the public key. (2) The second modification is in key algorithm and update algorithm. We consider all the operations as the following stations: Select
, and compute Q s P ζ ζ = , and
We modify the procedure as follows:
The public commits include
, where Bj C are the computable Lagrange interpolation coefficient. Compute
The public commits include U and
And then compute Firstly, the signer first selects
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, and computes U rP = .
And then the signer sends U to the requester. Blind: Select (1) Security The security of our schemes depends on the computation Diffie-Hellman assumption. The security proof of our schemes can be easy to be modified from the proof in [11] . Here we skip the proof procedure. (2) Efficiency.
Because our schemes are based on binary tree, they enjoy an advantage, that is, there is no cost parameters including key generation time, key update time, signing time, verifying time, and signature size, public key size, secret storage size has a complexity more than O(logT) in terms of the total number of time periods T in this scheme.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Adding forward security to signatures is an effective method to deal with the key exposure problem. In this paper, we construct two forward-secure multisignature schemes, one forward-secure threshold signature scheme, and one forward-secure blind signature scheme. Such schemes can be applied to many e-commerce applications. 
